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Abstract 
 
Although security is an important issue when developing 
complex computerised systems, very little work has been 
done in integrating security concerns in the agent-
oriented methodologies. This paper introduces extensions 
to the Tropos methodology to accommodate security. A 
description of new concepts is given along with an 
explanation of how these concepts are integrated to the 
current stages of Tropos. The above is illustrated using 
an agent-based health and social care information system 
as a case study.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is recognised amongst the agent research community 
[1,2,3] the need for developing a complete methodology 
for analysing and designing multi-agent systems. The 
main role of such a methodology will be to help in all the 
phases of the development of a system, and more 
importantly, to help capture and model the unique 
characteristics that agent-oriented systems introduce such 
as flexibility, autonomous problem solving, and the rich 
interactions between the individual agents.  
Security is an important issue when developing 
complex computerised systems. According to [4] 
“Security concerns must inform every phase of software 
development, from requirements engineering to design, 
implementation, testing and deployment”. We believe that 
if agent-oriented software engineering is to become 
widely accepted as a basis for developing complex 
computerised systems, agent-oriented software 
engineering methodologies must unify system engineering 
with security engineering.    
 Although many agent-oriented software engineering 
methodologies have been developed during the last few 
years (see [5] for an overview on the state of the art), very 
little work has been done in integrating security concerns 
during the analysis and design of an agent-based system.  
The common approach towards the inclusion of security 
within a system is to identify security requirements after 
the definition of a system. This approach has provoked the 
emergence of computer systems afflicted with security 
vulnerabilities [6]. From the viewpoint of the traditional 
security paradigm, it should be possible to eliminate such 
problems through more extensive use of formal methods 
and better software engineering. 
This paper introduces extensions to Tropos, an agent 
oriented software engineering methodology [7], to 
accommodate security concerns during the requirements 
analysis. The concept of constraints is also defined and 
the reason for employing constraints and how they can 
help in the analysis of the system’s security is described.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces security in software engineering while Section 
3 presents extensions to the Tropos methodology 
necessary for capturing security aspects of the system 
under development. In Section 4 we describe the security 
modeling features that we use in our approach, and in 
Section 5 we present how our approach can be integrated 
on the current Tropos stages. Finally, Section 6 presents 
some concluding remarks and directions for future work. 
The eSAP System (an agent-based health and social care 
information system) is used throughout the paper to 
illustrate the proposed extensions.  
 
2. Security in Software Engineering 
 
Security is usually defined in terms of the existence of 
properties such as confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, access control, non-repudiation and availability 
[6] and the ability to overcome possible threats.  
The security requirements of the system are obtained 
after studying the security policy1 of the organisation. 
Currently, the definition of security requirements is 
usually considered after the design of the system. This 
typically means that security enforcement mechanisms 
                                                 
1 A security policy is the set of decisions that, collectively, 
determines an organisation’s posture towards security. 
have to be fitted into a pre-existing design therefore 
leading to serious design challenges that usually translate 
into software vulnerabilities. Adopting a security focus 
through the overall system development process 
represents a solution to mitigate such problems. 
Software engineering considers security requirements, 
as well as performance and reliability requirements, as 
non-functional requirements. Non-functional requirements 
introduce quality characteristics but also they represent 
the constraints under which the system must operate. 
Software designers have already recognised the 
importance of integrating non-functional requirements, 
such as performance and reliability, into software design 
processes [8], however security requirements are still an 
afterthought. 
There are at least two reasons for the lack of support 
for security engineering [9]. Firstly, security requirements 
are generally difficult to analyse and model, and secondly 
because of developer lack of expertise for secure software 
development. Furthermore, security policies are generally 
specified in terms of security models that are not 
integrated with general software engineering models. 
In the current state of the art, security properties are, 
within the requirements engineering process, supported by 
a qualitative reasoning rather than a formal reasoning. 
Existing formal methods support the verification of a 
protocol, which has already been specified [10], while 
qualitative directions provide a process-oriented approach 
to represent non-functional requirements as potentially 
conflicting or concordant goals and using them during the 
development of software systems [11]. These approaches 
only guideline the way non-functional requirements, such 
as security, can be handled within a certain stage of the 
software development process. 
We believe that security should be considered during 
the whole development process and it should be defined 
together with the requirements specification. By 
considering security only in certain stages of the 
development process, more likely, security needs will 
conflict with functional requirements of the system. 
Taking security into account along with the functional 
requirements throughout the development stages helps to 
limit the cases of conflict, by identifying them very early 
in the system development, and find ways to overcome 
them. On the other hand, adding security as an 
afterthought not only increases the chances of such a 
conflict to exist, but it requires huge amount of money and 
valuable time to overcome it, once they have been 
identified (usually a major rebuild of the system is 
needed).   
The agent-oriented paradigm represents a feasible 
approach for the integration of security to software 
engineering. As mentioned in [1] agents act on behalf of 
individuals or companies interacting according to an 
underlying organisational context. The integration of 
security within the context will require for the rest of the 
subsystems to consider the security requirements, 
specified in the security policy, when specifying their 
objectives and interactions therefore causing the 
propagation of security requirements to the rest of the 
subsystems. However, at present, no agent-oriented 
software methodology considers security requirements as 
an integral part of the whole software development 
process. In the following section we extend Tropos 
methodology in order to consider security concerns in the 
early and late requirements analysis phases.   
 
3. Extending Tropos to Accommodate 
Security 
 
Tropos is a methodology, for building agent-oriented 
software systems, tailored to describe both the 
organisational environment of a system and the system 
itself. Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework [12], 
which uses the concepts of actors, who can be (social) 
agents (organisational, human or software), positions or 
roles, goals and social dependencies (such as soft goals, 
tasks, and resources) for defining the obligations of actors 
(dependees) to other actors (dependers). The type of the 
dependency describes the nature of an agreement (called 
dependum) between dependee and depender. Goal 
dependencies represent delegation of responsibility for 
fulfilling a goal; softgoal dependencies are similar to goal 
dependencies, but their fulfilment cannot be defined 
precisely; task dependencies are used in situations where 
the dependee is required to perform a given activity; and 
resource dependencies require the dependee to provide a 
resource to the depender. Graphically, actors are 
represented as circles; dependums – goals, softgoals, tasks 
and resources – are represented as ovals, clouds, 
hexagonal, and rectangle, respectively; and the 
dependencies have the form depender → dependum → 
dependee.  
Currently in Tropos, the process of integrating 
security and functional requirements throughout the whole 
range of the development stages is quite ad hoc. A 
systematic process that will guide the developer in 
considering security requirements (as well as other non-
functional requirements) during the whole development 
phases is necessary. Such a process will provide guidance, 
and it will use the same concepts and notations throughout 
the development phases. 
The last few years, work on agent oriented software 
engineering has been focused on providing a complete 
methodology that will help in all the phases of the 
development of an agent-oriented system, and more 
importantly it will help to capture and model the unique 
characteristics that agent-oriented systems introduce such 
as flexibility, autonomous problem-solving, and 
interactions between individual agents. However, security 
has been mainly ignored and very little work has been 
taken place in order for agent oriented software 
engineering methodologies to support security concerns 
during the development stages.  
On the other hand, although work has taken place on 
trying to capture non-functional requirements (including 
security) and consider different design alternatives [13, 
14], none of these approaches were developed with the 
agent paradigm in mind.   
Trying to close this gap, Eric Yu has recently initiated 
work that provides ways of modelling and reasoning about 
non-functional requirements (with emphasis on Security). 
Yu is using the concept of a soft goal to assess different 
design alternatives, and how each of these alternatives 
would contribute positively or negatively in achieving the 
soft goal.   
The concept of a soft goal is “used to model quality 
attributes for which there are no a priori, clear criteria for 
satisfaction, but are judged by actors as being sufficiently 
met” [15]. 
However, non-functional requirements may relate to 
system’s quality attributes, or alternatively may define 
constraints on the system [16,17]. Qualities are properties 
or characteristics of the system that its stakeholders care 
about, while constraints are restrictions, rules or 
conditions imposed to the system and unlike qualities are 
(theoretically) non negotiable. Thus, although the concept 
of a soft goal captures qualities, it fails to adequately 
capture constraints.  
Possible constraints might be imposed to the system 
as restrictions for satisfying the system’s goals (global or 
for each individual component). For example security 
constraints might be imposed on the system representing 
restrictions related to its security. Constraints might affect 
the analysis and design of the system, by restricting some 
alternative design solutions, conflict with some of the 
requirements of the system, and also by refining some of 
the goals of the system or introducing new ones that help 
the system towards the satisfaction of the constraint. 
 
3.1 Constraints 
 
Constraints are limitations (restrictions) that do not 
permit specific actions to be taken or prevent certain 
objectives from being achieved. Thus, constraints can 
represent a set of conditions; rules and restrictions 
imposed on a system, and the system must be operating in 
such a way that none of them will be violated.  
More often [19] constraints are integrated in the 
specification of existing concepts and are expressed in 
terms of informal textual descriptions. However, this 
approach leads many times to misunderstanding and an 
unclear definition of a constraint, and its role in the 
development of the system. This often results in errors in 
the very early development stages that propagate to the 
later stages of development causing many and serious 
problems when discovered, if they are discovered. In 
addition, integrating constraints on existing concepts 
might introduce problems when a system is modified.  
 Thus, we believe constraints must be introduced as a 
separate concept, next to other existing concepts (in our 
case actors, goals, soft goal, task and resources) during the 
whole range of the development process.  
Defining constraints as a separate concept does not 
mean isolate them from the rest of the system. Constraints 
are closely related with the parts of the system they 
restrict. The part of the system that a constraint restricts is 
called the context of the constraint [19]. In our case, the 
context can include a different number of goals, soft 
goals, and dependencies of the system. 
In addition, a constraint can contribute either 
positively or negatively to functional and non-functional 
requirements. This basically depends on the type of 
constraints (for example performance, reliability or 
security constraints) and the purpose for which they have 
been imposed to the system (for example to restrict access 
to the system).  
Constraints can be human-imposed or environment-
imposed. The first category includes constraints imposed 
by stakeholders, users, or actors, while the second 
category involves constraints imposed by organizations, 
policies, laws, rules or regulations. 
 
3.2 The eSAP case study 
 
To illustrate the need to extend Tropos, let us 
consider a system similar to the eSAP system first 
presented by Mouratidis et al [18]. In this system we have 
five actors: 
 
 Older Person: The Older Person that wishes to 
receive appropriate health and social care (patient) 
 Professional: The health and/or social care 
professional 
 DoH: The English Department of Health 
 Benefits Agency: An agency that helps the older 
person financially 
 R&D Agency: A research and development agency. 
 
To model the goals and the dependencies between the 
stakeholders (actors) Tropos introduces actor diagrams. In 
such a diagram each node represents an actor, and the 
links between the different actors indicate that one 
depends on the other to accomplish some goals. The 
actors diagram for the above actors is shown in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. The stakeholders of the eSAP system 
 
Although the dependencies between the actors are 
shown clearly, some possible constraints (in our case 
related to security) that might be imposed to some of the 
actors are not captured.  
For example, the Older Person depends on the 
Benefits Agency to Receive Financial Support but Older 
Person might introduce a constraint to the Benefits 
Agency such as to keep their financial information private.  
R&D Agency depends on the Professional to Obtain 
Clinical Information but the Professional might be 
restricted (for example by the DoH or the Older Person) 
to provide only anonymous medical information. In 
addition, the Older Person might restrict the Professional 
by imposing a constraint to share medical information 
only if the Older Person’s consent is obtained. 
Thus the Professional has to achieve their goals while 
having to satisfy different constraints imposed to them. 
Taking into considerations these constraints, it helps to 
refine existing goals and also introduce, in the later stages 
of the development, some extra (secure) goals to the 
Professional such as to Obtain Older Person Consent, to 
help towards the satisfaction of the constraints.   
An alternative way would be to introduce goals 
(related to security) to the actors without first imposing 
any constraints. For example, in the above example a goal 
such as Obtain Older Person Consent could be introduced 
to the Professional actor without analysing any constraints 
that could be imposed to the system. This would be 
possible, but it would represent a totally ad hoc process, 
depending only on the experience and the capability of the 
designer. Using the concept of constraints helps to provide 
a systematic approach in refining existing goals and also 
identifying goals that are related to the security of the 
system. It also gives reasons why these goals have to be 
introduced to the system, and in which actors.    
However there is confusion. The question why not 
capturing the constraints that are imposed to a system as 
the system’s goals? has been asked to the authors. For 
example, the constraints described above could be 
captured as goals as shown below (the arrows indicate 
dependency according to the Tropos concepts [7]): 
Older Person -> Keep Financial Info Private -> Benefit 
Agency 
 
R&D Agency -> Only provide anonymous medical info -> 
Professional 
 
Older Person -> Share this info only if consent is obtained  
-> Professional
 
The confusion mainly comes from the fact that 
constraints can be incorporated in the specification of 
existing concepts. However, the concept of a constraint is 
different from the concept of a goal. A goal represents a 
desired state of the world, while a constraint represents a 
condition, rule, or restriction towards the achievement of a 
goal. Although a goal can be achieved with various ways, 
a constraint defines a set of restrictions on how the goal 
will be achieved. Considering the difference between a 
goal and a constraint we see the statements made are not 
correct.  
Keep Financial Info Private is not a goal of the Older 
Person (the goal is to Receive Financial Support) but 
rather a restriction imposed in achieving the goal. 
R&D Agency -> Only to provide anonymous medical 
info -> Prof. According to this statement the R&D Agency 
has a goal to Receive Only Anonymous Medical 
Information from the Professional. However, this is not 
true because the R&D Agency would be happy to get 
named information but the Professional cannot provide 
named information because it has been restricted by the 
Older Person or by laws (Department of Health). 
Older Person -> share info only if consent is obtained 
-> Professional. This is not a goal that the Older Person 
has and depends on the Professional but rather a 
constraint that restricts the Professional in achieving the 
goal Provide Appropriate Care that the Older Person 
depends on him. 
 
4. Security Modelling Features 
We introduce the concepts of security diagram, 
security constraint, secure dependency, and secure goal, 
task, and resource. 
 
4.1. Security Diagram  
A security diagram is constructed after analysing the 
security requirements of the system-to-be and its 
environment and it is similar to the security catalogue first 
introduced by Yu [15]. The process of analysing the 
security requirements of the system-to-be and its 
environment is not unique and it depends on the engineer. 
This process usually involves identification of the security 
needs of the system; problems related to the security of 
the system (such as possible threats and vulnerabilities) 
and possible solutions to the security problems (these 
solutions can usually be identified in terms of a security 
policy that the organisation might have).  
The usability of the security diagram is twofold.  
Firstly it helps a designer to identify possible constraints 
that must be introduced to the system-to-be (by taking into 
account the security needs of the system) and secondly to 
identify in the later stages of the design possible means 
(security mechanisms) that contribute to the satisfaction of 
the security constraints that are introduced to the system. 
In addition to that, the security diagram displays some 
general advantages: 
 
 It provides a framework of security needs, threats and 
possible solutions using concepts known to the 
software engineer. In this work we are interested in 
extending Tropos methodology, so we have adopted 
the diagram using Tropos’ concepts such as goals, 
tasks, and soft goals. That means the software 
engineer can use the same concepts throughout the 
whole Tropos development process. 
 Many systems under development are similar to 
systems already in existence. Thus the security 
diagram can be used as a reference point that can be 
modified or extended according to specific needs of 
particular systems, saving developers time and effort.  
 
For the construction process of the security diagram 
the engineer takes into consideration the security features 
of the system-to-be, the protection objectives of the 
system, the security mechanisms, and also the threats to 
the system’s security features. The security diagram 
represents the connection between security features, 
threats, protection objectives, and security mechanisms 
that help towards the satisfaction of the objectives. Thus, 
each security feature identified receives positive 
contributions from different protection objectives and 
negative contributions from the threats. Positive 
contributions help towards the satisfaction of the security 
feature while negative contributions put in danger the 
security feature. In addition, the diagram captures possible 
security mechanisms that contribute positively or 
negatively to the protection objectives. 
Security features (also protection properties) 
represent features associated to security that the system-
to-be must have. We are using the concept of a soft goal 
to capture security features on the security diagram. This 
decision have taken place since the concept of a soft goal 
is “used to model quality attributes for which there are no 
a priori, clear criteria for satisfaction, but are judged by 
actors as being sufficiently met” [15]. In the same sense, 
security features are not subject to any clear criteria for 
satisfaction. Examples of security features are privacy, 
safety, accountability, availability, and integrity.  
Threats on the other hand represent circumstances 
that have the potential to cause loss or problems that can 
put in danger the security features of the system. 
Protection objectives represent a set of principles or rules 
that contribute towards the achievement of the security 
features. These principles identify possible solutions to 
the security problems and usually they can be found in the 
form of the security policy of the organisation. We are 
representing protection objectives using the concept of a 
goal. This has been decided because a goal defines 
desired states of the world. In the same sense, a protection 
objective represents desired security states that the system 
must have.  
Security mechanisms identify possible protection 
mechanisms of achieving protection objectives. In order 
to represent security mechanisms we are employing the 
concept of a task. A task represents a way of doing 
something, such as the satisfaction of a goal.  However, it 
must be noticed that tasks (security mechanisms) can 
contribute positively (+) but also negatively (-) to different 
protection goals. The following figure shows the above-
mentioned concepts and how they are graphically 
represented in the security diagram. 
 
 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the security 
concepts 
 
A part of the security diagram for the eSAP system is 
shown on figure 3. In the presented security diagram we 
take into consideration two desired security features of the 
eSAP system; privacy and availability. It must be noticed 
that this diagram is not meant to be a precise and complete 
security diagram of the eSAP system but rather serves as 
an illustration diagram to help better understand the 
concepts and notations of a security diagram. Both 
privacy and availability are receiving negative 
contributions from different threats on the system such as 
Social Engineering, Eavesdropping and Cryptographic 
Attacks, Viruses, System Crashes and Denial of Service 
Attacks.   
On the other hand, the privacy of the system is 
receiving positive contributions from different protection 
objectives identified during the security analysis of the 
system. In our case we have mainly identified the 
protection objectives taking into consideration the security 
policy proposed by Ross [20] about medical information 
systems.   
For example one of the most important protection 
objectives that helps the privacy of the system is Access  
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4.2 Security Constraints 
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protection objectives that the security diagram has 
captured for the privacy security features, such as Access 
Control or Cryptography. In this case the “root” 
constraint Keep Data Private can be decomposed to 
Allow Access Only to Personal Care Plan and Allow 
Only Encrypted Data Transfer. However, this is not a 
strict process and it depends on the designers and the 
design decisions they might take. For example, it is 
possible that a protection objective will not impose a 
sub-constraint to a root constraint. Constraints are 
analysed according to the constraint analysis processes 
(due to lack of space these analysis processes are not 
described in this paper).  
By imposing security constraints to different parts 
of the system, we are able to identify possible conflicts 
between security and other (functional and non 
functional) requirements of the system, identify 
(stakeholder) constraints that can put in danger the 
security of the system, and propose possible ways 
towards a design that will integrate security and systems 
engineering leading to the development of a more secure 
system. 
It is worth mentioning that we consider a security 
constraint contributing to a higher level of abstraction, 
meaning that a security constraint does not involve the 
identification of particular security protocols so that it 
does not restrict the development of the system to a 
specific security solution. This means we are not taking 
into consideration specific security protocols that should 
be decided during the implementation of the system, and 
that most of the times restrict the design with the use of a 
particular implementation language. A security 
constraint is represented graphically as shown in figure 
4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Graphical representation of a security 
constrain   
 
4.3 Secure Entities 
The term secure entities involves any secure goals, 
tasks and resources of the system. A secure entity is 
introduced to the actor (or the system) in order to help in 
the achievement of a security constraint. For example if 
the professional actor has a security constraint Share 
Info Only If Consent Obtained a secure goal is 
introduced to this actor Obtain OP Consent in order to 
help in the achievement of the constraint. In a later 
stage, capabilities are added to the actor (according to 
the security entities added) in order to guarantee the 
security constraints.   
A secure goal does not particularly define how the 
security constraint can be achieved, since (as in the 
definition of a goal) alternatives can be considered. 
However, this is possible through a secure task, since a 
task specifies a way of doing something. Thus, a secure 
task represents a particular way for satisfying a secure 
goal. For example, for the secure goal Check 
Authorisation we might have secure tasks such as Check 
Password or Check Digital Signatures. 
A resource that is related to a secure entity or a 
security constraint is considered a secure resource. For 
example, an actor depends on another actor to receive 
some information. However, this dependency (resource 
dependency) is restricted by a constraint Only Encrypted 
Info. 
Secure Entities are represented by introducing an S 
within brackets (S) before the text description as shown 
in figure 5.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Representation of a secure goal, task, 
resource.  
 
4.4 Secure Dependencies 
A secure dependency introduces security 
constraint(s), proposed either by the depender (most 
likely) or the dependee (most unlikely) in order to 
successfully satisfy the dependency. Both the depender 
and the dependee must agree in this constraint (or 
constraints) for the secure dependency to be valid. That 
means, in the depender side, the depender expects from 
the dependee to satisfy the security constraints while in 
the dependee side, a secure dependency means that the 
dependee will make an effort to deliver the dependum by 
satisfying the security constraint(s). There are two 
degrees of security: Open Secure dependency (normal 
dependency) and Secure dependency. In an Open Secure 
Dependency some security conditions might be 
introduced but if the dependee fail to satisfy them, the 
consequences will not be serious. This means that the 
security of the system will not be in danger if some of 
these conditions are not satisfied. An Open Secure 
Dependency is graphically represented (figure 6) as 
unmarked (as the normal dependency).  On the other 
side, there are three different types of a secure 
dependency: 
− Depender Secure Dependency, depender depends 
on dependee, and depender introduces security 
constraints for the dependency. The dependee must 
satisfy the security constraints introduced by the 
depender, otherwise the security of the dependency 
will be in risk. This type of secure dependency is 
graphically represented with a constraint at the side 
of the dependee (figure 6). 
− Dependee Secure Dependency, depender depends 
on dependee and dependee introduces security 
constraints for the dependency. Depender must 
satisfy the security constraints introduced by the 
dependee in order to help in the achievement of the 
secure dependency. This type of secure dependency 
is graphically represented with a constraint at the 
side of the depender (figure 6). 
− Double Secure Dependency, depender depends on 
dependee and both depender and dependee 
introduce security constraints for the dependency. 
Both must satisfy the security constraints introduced 
to achieve the secure dependency. This type of 
secure dependency is represented with constraints 
on both sides (figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. The different types of secure 
dependencies 
 
5. Security Integration in Tropos 
Tropos covers four phases of software development: 
− Early Requirements, concerned with the 
understanding of a problem by studying an existing 
organisational setting; the output of this phase is an 
organisational model, which includes relevant actors 
and their respective dependencies.  
− Late requirements, where the system-to-be is 
described within its operational environment, along 
with relevant functions and qualities. This 
description models the system as a (small) number 
of actors, which have a number of dependencies 
with actors in their environment; these dependencies 
define the system’s functional and non-functional 
requirements.  
− Architectural design, where the system’s global 
architecture is defined in terms of subsystems, 
interconnected through data and control flows; 
within the diagram, subsystems are represented as 
actors and data/control interconnections are 
represented as (system) actor dependencies.  
− Detailed design, where each architectural 
component is defined in further detail in terms of 
inputs, outputs, control, and other relevant 
information. Tropos uses elements of AUML [21] to 
complement the features of i*. Agent capabilities 
and interactions are specified. 
 
The process of security is basically one of analysing 
the security needs of the stakeholders and the system in 
terms of security constraints imposed to the system and 
the stakeholders, identify secure entities that guarantee 
the satisfaction of the security constraints, and assign 
capabilities to the system to help towards the satisfaction 
of the secure entities. So far in this work, we have 
focused in the integration of security during the early 
and late requirement stages of the Tropos methodology. 
Thus, the security process is integrated in the Tropos 
stages as follows. 
 
5.1. Early Requirements 
In the early requirements analysis the Security 
Diagram (SD) is constructed as described in a previous 
section. In addition, security constraints are imposed to 
the stakeholders of the system (by other stakeholders). 
These constraints are analysed and security entities are 
introduced.  
In our example, the Older Person depends on the 
Benefits Agency to Receive Financial Support. 
However, the Older Person worries about the privacy of 
their finances so they impose a constraint to the Benefits 
Agency actor, to keep their financial information private. 
The Professional depends on the Older Person to 
Obtain Information, however one of the most important 
and delicate matters for a patient (in our case the older 
person) is the privacy of their personal medical 
information, and the sharing of it. Thus most of the times 
the Professional is imposed a constraint to share this 
information if and only if consent is achieved.  One of 
the main goals of the R&D Agency is to Obtain Clinical 
Information in order to perform tests and research. To 
get this information the R&D Agency depends on the 
Professional. However, the Professional is imposed a 
constraint (by the Department of Health) to Keep Patient 
Anonymity.   
The following figure illustrates part of the actor 
diagram of the eSAP system taking into consideration 
the above-mentioned constraints that are imposed to the 
stakeholders of the system.  
 
Figure 7. The actor diagram including security 
constraints 
In addition, the security constraints imposed at each 
actor are further analysed by identifying which goals of 
the actor they restrict (Figure 8). The assignment of a 
security constraint to a goal is indicated using a 
constraint link (a link that has the “restricts” tag). For 
example, the Professional actor has been imposed two 
security constraints (Share Info Only If Consent 
Achieved and Keep Patient Anonymity). During the 
means-end analysis of the Professional actor we have 
identified the Share Medical Info goal. However, this 
goal is restricted by the Share Info Only If Consent 
Achieved constraint imposed to the Professional by the 
Older Person. For the Professional to satisfy the 
constraint, a secure goal is introduced Obtain Older 
Person Consent. However this goal can be achieved 
with many different ways, for example a Professional 
can obtain the consent personally or can ask a nurse to 
obtain the consent on their behalf. Thus a sub-constraint 
is introduced, Only Obtain Consent Personally. This sub 
constraint introduces another secure goal Personally 
Obtain Consent. This goal is divided into two sub-tasks 
Obtain Consent by Mail or Obtain Consent by Phone.  
The Professional has also a goal to Provide Medical 
Information for Research. However, the constraint Keep 
Patient Anonymity has been imposed to the 
Professional, which restricts the Provide Medical 
Information for Research goal. As a result of this 
constraint a secure goal is introduced to the 
Professional, Provide Only anonymous Info. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Means-ends analysis of the Professional Actor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Late Requirements 
During the late requirements stage, security 
constraints are imposed to the system-to-be (by taking 
into account the security diagram). These constraints are 
further analysed according to the constraint analysis 
processes. The main aim of the eSAP system (Figure 9) 
is to Automate Care in order to help professionals 
provide faster and more efficient care, and allow on the 
other hand older people get more involved in their care. 
Taking into consideration the security diagram, of the 
previous section, we see there are two main constraints 
imposed (by the desired security features of the system- 
privacy and availability) to the eSAP’s main goal - Keep 
Data Private and Keep Data Available. For the eSAP to 
satisfy these constraints two secure goals have been 
identified. Ensure Data Privacy and Ensure Data 
Availability.  Although, these statements initially seem 
very superficial they can be further analysed. In our case 
we focus only on the Keep Data Private constraint. This 
constraint can be further analysed to sub-constraints  
Allow Only Encrypted Transfer of Data, Allow Only 
Authorised Access, and Allow Access Only to Personal 
Care Plan. Taking into consideration the security 
diagram, secure goals are introduced to help towards 
the satisfaction of the imposed security constraints. Thus 
the secure goals Use Cryptography, Check 
Authorisation, Check Access Control, and Check 
Information Flow are introduced.  In addition, some of 
the secure goals are further analysed in terms of secure 
tasks. Thus, the Use Cryptography goal is divided to 
two secure tasks Encrypt Data and Decrypt Data. It 
must be noticed in this point that although someone 
might thought of further decomposing these tasks by 
indicating for example the type of the encryption 
algorithm this is not the case, since the type of the 
encryption algorithm depends on the implementation of 
the system and it will restrict the developers of the 
system in a particular implementation style. The Check 
Authorisation is decomposed into four secure tasks, 
Check Password, Check Digital Signatures, Check 
Biometrics and Call Back. However, it is indicated in the 
diagram that the last two tasks contribute negatively 
towards the mobility of the system, and this is one factor 
that the developers must take into consideration in the 
implementation of the system.     
 
6. Conclusions and future work 
In this paper we have presented extensions to the 
Tropos methodology, so that it can deal with capturing 
security concerns of the system-to-be.  During the 
process of extending Tropos it was concluded that 
Tropos methodology facilitates the consideration of 
security requirements for different reasons: 
 
− By considering the overall software development 
process it is easy to identify security requirements at 
the early requirements stage and propagate them 
until the implementation stage. This introduces a 
security-oriented paradigm to the software 
engineering process. 
− Tropos allows a hierarchical approach towards 
security. Security would be defined in different 
levels of complexity, which will allow the software 
engineer a better understanding while advancing 
through the process. 
− Iteration allows the re-definition of security 
requirements in different levels therefore providing 
a better integration with system functionality. 
− Consideration of the organisational environment 
facilitates the understanding of the security needs in 
terms of the security policy. 
− Functional and non-functional requirements are 
defined together however a clear distinction is 
provided. 
 
Our aim is to provide a clear well guided process of 
integrating security and functional requirements 
throughout the whole range of the development stages. 
Such a process must use the same concepts and notations 
throughout the development phases. 
As mentioned, the presented extensions apply only 
to the first two stages (early and late requirements) of 
the Tropos methodology. So far we are able to impose 
security constraints that help towards the satisfaction of 
the desired security features. We analyse the system in 
terms of security constraints imposed to the system and 
the stakeholders and then identify secure entities that 
guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints. 
Future work involves the assignment of capabilities 
to the system to help towards the satisfaction of the 
secure entities, and verify the security of the system by 
analysing potential attacks and if necessary introduce 
extra secure capabilities. Then, the design of the system 
will take place by taking into consideration the security 
analysis performed in the previous stages.  
More specifically, during the architectural design 
stage security constraints, which imposed to the new 
actors of the system, can be further identified. Then 
secure capabilities can be identified and assigned to each 
agent of the system. Finally, scenarios can be used to 
check the security of the system. In the case where 
security vulnerabilities are identified, extra secure 
capabilities can be introduced to the system to help 
towards the identified vulnerabilities. 
During the detailed design stage, the agent 
capabilities and interactions can be specified taking into 
account the security aspects. AUML notation can be 
used by introducing the tag of security rules.  This is 
 Figure 9. Means-ends analysis of the eSAP System 
 
 
similar to the business rules that UML has for defining 
constraints on the diagrams.  
In addition, we are constantly refining and checking 
the identified concepts, notations, and process by 
applying them to different real life examples in order to 
justify them. 
Tropos graphical representation is complemented 
using Formal Tropos [22], a rich specification language 
inspired by KAOS [23]. Formal Tropos provides a 
textual notation for i* models and is amenable to formal 
analysis. However, Formal Tropos was not conceived 
with security in mind and it fails to adequately model 
many security aspects. Towards this direction, we are 
extending Formal Tropos in order to accommodate 
security modeling according to the above-proposed 
extensions.    
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